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Abstract
This article has four aims: (1) to supplement an extant literature on Japan’s role in the G7/8
summit process by cataloguing events during the 2003 Group of Eight (G8) Summit1 held in
Evian, France, from the Japanese government’s point of view; (2) to highlight the main actors
involved in this process, their objectives, and the degree of success in their ability to achieve
these objectives at Evian; (3) to demonstrate how the Japanese government has instrumentalized
a multilateral forum, namely the G8, in order to pursue the resolution of what is essentially a
bilateral issue – the abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korean agents (racchi jiken) – a
strategy that it adopted in the 1990s unsuccessfully to seek resolution of the Northern Territories’
dispute, but is becoming increasingly evident in other areas of its foreign policy; and (4) to
review Japan’s traditional role in the summit as representative of Asia and discuss whether this
will come under threat with the limited, but nevertheless precedent-setting, participation of China
in the Evian Summit.
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Introduction
The twenty-ninth meeting of the G8 summit took place at the Royal Parc Evian Hotel from June
1 to 3, 2003 in the resort of Evian-les-Bains, famed for its mineral water, in France. This was a
significant watershed for the G8 summit process as it heralded the end of the previous four
cycles of rotation amongst the former seven members and the complete integration of Russia into
the summit process.2
On the one hand, over recent years and thanks largely to the Ashgate series of publications on the
G8 and global governance, interest has increased in the history, roles, functioning and future of
the G7/8 summit process.3 On the other hand, although interest in Japan’s role in multilateral
forums has traditionally focused upon the United Nations (UN) as the main conduit, recently,
and despite having been inexplicably ignored prior to this, attention has similarly been given to
Japan’s role in the G7/8.4 This article supplements this empirical data and continues to deepen
the analysis by focusing upon the most recent summit in a constantly evolving process of
multilateral diplomacy, in addition to highlighting the increasingly common practices in
Japanese foreign policy of instrumentalizing multilateral forums to resolve bilateral issues,
playing the role of Asian representative (Ajia no daihyo), and demonstrating its commitment to
international society.
Japan’s Role at the Summit
The Japanese government and its people’s ambitions and actions at the previous twenty-eight
summits since the process began in 1975 have already been adumbrated and analyzed
elsewhere.5 Although largely dominated by the prime minister of the day and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MOFA), a range of other governmental and non-governmental actors have been
allowed a degree of input into the preparations for the summit, including other ministries
interested in the issues of the day, opposition parties, business associations and, more recently as
a process of ‘outreach’, groups representing both domestic and international civil society. All of
these participants in the summit process has been motivated by a number of norms—defined
broadly as ideals or expectations of how an individual actor ought to behave that shape the
identity of the actor. In the case of the G7/8 summit, the norms that have molded Japan’s role in
the summit since 1975 have been bilateralism, East Asianism and internationalism. Thus, in turn,
the Japanese government and its people have regarded the summit as an important multilateral
mechanism by which to reinforce their key relationship with the US and address a range of
bilateral issues; seized the opportunity to promote issues of Asian concern, such as Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), as the region’s representative at a multilateral forum otherwise
dominated by European and North American leaders; cherished the recognition that membership
of a meeting of contemporary great powers accords, whilst also seeking to demonstrate a
commitment to international society via this forum and secure its successful functioning. In
short, the summit matters to the Japanese government and its people.
The above does not mean that the structure of the international system is irrelevant. As
mentioned above, the 2003 Evian Summit represents an important development in the summit’s
history; namely, the beginning of the fifth round of rotation and the final and full inclusion of
Russia. As far as the Japanese government has been concerned, the inclusion of Russia has been
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a long and painful process since the early 1990s, yet with the announcement at the 2002
Kananaskis Summit of the award of all remaining privileges associated with a summit member,
Russia was entitled at Evian to participate in the economic discussions and will host the 2006
summit.6 However, this final decision was greeted in Japan with misgivings and fears that this
would lead to a dilution of Japan’s influence at the summit through the addition of another
European participant. Thus, the collapse of bipolarity and the changing structure of the
international system have had a delayed impact on the summit process, which is only now
coming to light. During the summit’s fifth cycle the nature of Russia’s participation will come to
the fore and it will become evident whether this will make the summit more of a European affair,
thereby excluding Japan, or possibly herald a further expansion of the summit to admit China,
thereby emphasizing the Asian region but creating different problems for the Japanese
government in playing its traditional role of Asian representative. However, before returning to
these and other issues later in this article, it is necessary to understand the role played by the
Japanese government in the run-up to and during the Evian Summit.
Before Evian
The media coverage in the run-up to and during the Evian Summit focused on both the divisions
over the US-led war in Iraq, personified by US President George W. Bush and French President
Jacques Chirac, its postwar reconstruction, and the anti-globalization protests that have become a
feature of any large-scale, international meeting.7
In Japan, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro mentioned the 2003 G8 summit in his address to the
Diet on January 31, 2003 as one in a series of international meetings at which “Japan will play a
major role toward the resolution of important issues including sustainable development, poverty
and infectious diseases in developing countries”.8 This desire to play a major role in the Evian
Summit became evident at an early stage. Prior to the leaders’ meeting at Evian, a G8
environment ministers’ meeting was held in Paris from April 25 to 27, 2003. At this meeting a
Japanese proposal to create global standards for the accurate measurement of the consumption of
natural resources in G8 nations was tabled and discussed.9 The Final Communiqué
diplomatically avoided mention of the Kyoto Protocol, from which the US had withdrawn, and
acknowledged Japan’s contribution:
…we note with interest Japan’s proposal to launch an international joint research
project on economy-wide material flow accounts to develop a common measurement
system of material flow, building on existing work at the international level.10
Since the 1998 Birmingham Summit, the foreign and finance ministers’ meetings have been held
separately from the leaders’ meetings. The Evian Summit was no exception to this trend: the G8
Finance Ministers’ Meeting took place in Deauville, France from May 16 to 17, 2003, and the
G8 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting took place in Paris from May 22 to 23, 2003. The finance
ministers’ meeting was a relatively low-key meeting, held to review and confirm the general
direction of the more regularly held meetings of the G7 finance ministers and central bank
governors. Despite much media attention in the run-up to the meeting, the issue of postwar Iraqi
reconstruction was deferred until the leaders’ meeting. Ministry of Finance (MOF) Minister
Shiokawa Masajuro pledged in the finance ministers’ statement that, “Japan will continue its
structural reforms, including in its financial and corporate sectors, and intensify its efforts to
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combat deflation”.11 As regards aid policies, MOF’s position was one of support in principle but
with little to contribute concretely in the way of funds.12 After the meeting, Shiokawa reported to
Koizumi on May 20, 2003 before the latter’s departure on an official tour of the US.
MOFA Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko attended the foreign ministers’ meeting, which resulted in a
summary that expressed support for the role and work of the UN and highlighted security issues
across the globe including Afghanistan, India-Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, Israel, and North Korea.13 The
meeting and resulting summary were characterized as ‘half full’ by US Secretary of State Colin
Powell and Canadian Foreign Minister Bill Graham and led to an initial US-Franco
reconciliation after the stand-off over the war in Iraq that would be built upon by the leaders a
week later in Evian.14 In the case of the most pressing security concern for Japan, namely North
Korea, the summary expressed support for the various efforts being made to resolve the issue of
North Korea’s nuclear weapons’ development program, called on North Korea to uphold its
international commitments and behave in a restrained manner, and stressed multilateral
approaches to the issue by stating:
The North Korean nuclear issue constitutes a threat to international peace and stability.
North Korea’s compliance with its non-proliferation commitments is a matter of
concern for the entire international community. The Security Council has been and
remains seized of the matter and should play a constructive role.15
Kawaguchi also successfully sought the support and understanding of her G8 counterparts on the
issue of the kidnapping of Japanese citizens by North Korean government agents throughout the
1970s and 1980s (racchi jiken), which was eventually acknowledged during Koizumi’s historic
visit to Pyongyang in September 2002. To this end, the final summary declared:
They [G8 Foreign Ministers] supported the efforts made by the different parties to
seek a comprehensive solution by peaceful means to the North Korean nuclear issue
and to other matters including unresolved humanitarian problems such as the
abduction issue.16
This represented the first, clear statement of the abduction issue in documentation resulting from
a G7/8 ministerial meeting.17 According to one satisfied MOFA official, these statements
represented ‘full marks’ (manten) for Japan.18
On the issue of SARS, a cause of obvious and deep concern in Asia, the summary called for a
collective response, stating that:
The problem posed by the current epidemic in Asia went beyond the regional
framework. The entire international community, and especially the industrialized
countries, should stand firmly against it. Considering the global nature of this
epidemic, Ministers stressed the collective responsibility of the international
community, which calls for the joint management of the problem.19
In addition, Kawaguchi took the opportunity presented by this multilateral meeting to conduct
bilateral discussions with her Italian and UK counterparts, Franco Frattini and Jack Straw, on the
Middle East peace process and international society’s assistance to postwar Iraq.20 As will be
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discussed below, SARS, the issue of North Korea’s nuclear weapons’ program and the bilateral
issue of racchi jiken were revisited a week later at the meeting of the leaders at Evian.
The Evian Summit, June 1 to 3, 2003
The immediate vicinity surrounding the tranquil resort of Evian was subject to tight security in
anticipation of a “September 11th-type scenario”.21 As a result, the nearby Swiss cities of
Geneva and Lausanne became the target of anti-globalisation demonstrations, some of which
were peaceful whilst others were violent in nature. The French hosts continued various trends in
hosting a summit by: (1) separating the ministerial and leaders’ meetings, as was begun at the
1998 Birmingham Summit; (2) selecting a secluded spot like the mountain retreat chosen for the
previous year’s Kananaskis Summit; and (3) promoting a policy of “outreach” to embrace non-
G8 members. However, the summit agenda was broadly divided into four categories – solidarity,
responsibility, security and democracy – and, thus, was much more open-ended than had been
the case at previous summits. This resulted in the release of a record number of sixteen
declarations constituting more paperwork than at any other summit.22
Koizumi left Japan on May 29, 2003 to join the other G8 leaders in St Petersburg for the city’s
300th anniversary celebration, assisted by his sherpa, Fujisaki Ichiro, Deputy Minister for
Foreign Affairs (gaimu shingikan). Fujisaki declared North Korea and a strategy against SARS
to be the most important issues for Japan at Evian, in addition to the importance of scientific
research that encourages the co-existence of economic growth and environmental preservation,
the strengthening of anti-terrorist and non-proliferation policies, and assistance for Africa in
fighting Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and polio.23 On May 31, 2003 a
“summit of the poor” opened in Mali, and an alternative three-day NGO “Summit for Another
World” closed in Annemasse, whilst the leaders assembled in Evian prior to their first meeting –
a working lunch on June 1, 2003.24 This summit differed from previous summits in that an
unprecedented number of leaders of the developing world were invited to participate on the first
day. The G8 leaders met with the leaders of Algeria, Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Malaysia,
Mexico, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, and South Africa, joined by the heads of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), UN, World Bank and World Trade Organization (WTO), to
take part in the enlarged dialogue working session on the afternoon of the first day.25 The G8
leaders and Kofi Annan continued their dialogue with the leaders of Algeria, Nigeria, Senegal
and South Africa during a working dinner that evening as part of the New Partnership for
Africa’s Development (NEPAD).26 Topics for discussion on Africa included peacekeeping,
trade, aid and investment, and AIDS.27 The leaders released an implementation report that
reviewed the Africa Action Plan (AAP) agreed a year previously at Kananaskis to define and
develop G8 nations’ engagement with Africa in support of NEPAD. Japan’s level of engagement
included the cancellation of US$4.9 billion in official debts, hosting the 3rd Tokyo International
Conference on African Development (TICAD III) in September 2003, aid contributions as part
of that process, increased investment and loans, granting trade concessions on agricultural goods,
and cooperation in parasite control, food security and clean water provision.28
The second day of the summit consisted of a series of meetings of only the G8 leaders. Economic
issues were discussed in the morning session and the end of 2004 was confirmed as the target for
the conclusion of the Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations. Security issues, especially
anti-terrorist measures, were addressed during a working lunch, during which Koizumi stated to
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his fellow summiteers that his government was seeking “a peaceful and comprehensive solution
to the North Korean nuclear problem and the abduction issue”.29 A G8 declaration entitled “Non-
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction” was issued that announced the leaders’
willingness to use a range of tools to tackle the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, and “…if necessary other measures in accordance with international law”.30 In
reference to North Korea, it stated that:
North Korea’s uranium enrichment and plutonium production programs and its failure
to comply with its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement
undermine the non-proliferation regime and are a clear breach of North Korea’s
international obligations. We strongly urge North Korea to visibly, verifiably and
irreversibly dismantle any nuclear weapons programs, a fundamental step to facilitate
a comprehensive and peaceful solution.31
The leaders posed for the “family” photograph in the hotel’s grounds in the afternoon, after
which Bush left to continue the Middle East peace talks. The afternoon session addressed
sustainable development in general and mention was made of SARS specifically within the
adopted G8 Action Plan on Health. To support this anti-SARS strategy, Koizumi announced
additional contributions to be channeled through the World Bank and Asian Development Bank
totaling ¥700 million (US$6 million approximately).32 Finally, although UK Prime Minister
Tony Blair departed beforehand, a free discussion was conducted during a working dinner – a
format originally proposed by Koizumi, singled out and praised by Chirac, but somewhat
deflated by the non-attendance of Bush and Blair.33 During this dinner, Koizumi raised racchi
jiken as a topic for discussion and received the sympathy of his summit partners.34
The final day consisted of a brief session to decide the Chair’s Summary, and a press conference
by Chirac at which it was announced. On North Korea, the Chair’s Summary stated that:
We addressed the North Korean nuclear issue in our Statement on non-proliferation
[see above]. We support the efforts made by the different parties to seek by peaceful
means a comprehensive solution to the North Korean nuclear issue and to other
matters, including unresolved humanitarian problems such as the abductions. We also
support the Peace and Prosperity Policy pursued by the Republic of Korea.35
Building upon the statement released at the foreign ministers’ meeting a week previously, this
represented the first, unequivocal statement of support by the leaders of the G8 nations on the
issue of racchi jiken.
After the summit was officially concluded and before departing for Japan, Koizumi gave a press
conference at which he praised the summit and underscored his efforts to link the two issues of
North Korea’s nuclear weapons’ development program and racchi jiken:
With regard to North Korea, many countries are more concerned about the nuclear
weapons development program of North Korea. As far as Japan is concerned, whilst
the nuclear issue certainly is a grave issue, the abduction issue is of paramount
importance as well. We believe that the nuclear and other security issues as well as the
abduction issues and others need to be dealt with comprehensively and unlike in the
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case of Iraq, we shall continue to pursue a diplomatic and peaceful resolution to the
North Korean problem. I believe this understanding was shared among all of the G8
leaders.36
Koizumi arrived back in Japan on the evening of June 4, 2003. The next day he reported on the
summit to the House of Representatives and (possibly feeling emboldened by his performance at
Evian and the support of the international community) referred to racchi jiken for the first time
as an act of terrorism.37 His return was parodied in an Asahi Shinbun cartoon with reference to a
recent earthquake in the north of the Japanese mainland registering highly on the scale of seismic
activity (shindo). Koizumi was depicted striding confidently from his plane having scored a
number of points through his diplomacy and declaring that thanks to the G8 summit he had
regained his degree of confidence (shindo).38
Evian as a Success
The Evian Summit managed to produce a fragile consensus amongst the G8 leaders, so recently
divided over the war in Iraq, largely by avoiding such controversial topics and spending only
eight minutes of the second day’s working lunch discussing Iraq.39 Bush and Chirac were on
first-name terms, declared friendship and displayed a tactile relationship to the world’s media.40
This alone was no small achievement and as Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien stated “[i]t
was a good meeting – it could have been a disaster”.41
The G8 Research Group, the independent and international network of scholars of the G8 based
at the University of Toronto, have issued grades assessing both the summit’s performance on
various issues and each country’s individual performance after each summit. After the Evian
Summit, Japan was awarded a grade of ‘A minus’, placing it alongside Italy, Russia and the US
as the top performing nations. This represented a performance above the average grade of ‘B
plus’ amongst the summiteers, and also an improvement from Japan’s ‘B plus’ performance at
the 2002 Kananaskis Summit.42 Yet, in what way can the Evian Summit be regarded as a success
for Japan?
Domestic Response
As regards Koizumi, Evian can be regarded as a personal success. This was his third summit,
thereby making him, alongside Hashimoto Ryutaro, the second most consistent Japanese
participant (Nakasone Yasuhiro holds the record of having attended five summits from the 1983
Williamsburg Summit to the 1987 Venice Summit). Koizumi appears comfortable on the
international stage of the summit and it was noted that he appeared to be the most relaxed of the
G8 leaders.43 Since its inception, the G7/8 summit has been regarded as an opportunity for the
leader of any participating nation to improve his domestic standing, and in all likelihood
Koizumi gave a strong diplomatic performance with the September 2003 election for the
presidency of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and the November election for the
House of Representatives, in mind (he was ultimately successful in both). According to Asahi
Shinbun opinion polls conducted before and after the summit, the approval rating for the
Koizumi administration declined slightly from 48 per cent to 47 per cent, but the disapproval
rating decreased more significantly from 37 per cent to 34 per cent; Koizumi’s foreign and
defence policies were particularly the object of praise.44 Thus, there was little correlation
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between Koizumi’s highly evaluated performance and his marginal position in the official family
photograph of G8 leaders taken on the afternoon of the second day of the summit, second from
the left between President of the European Commission Romano Prodi and German Chancellor
Gerhard Schröder. At Williamsburg, and although Nakasone himself claims it to have been an
accident, the Japanese media and public paid great attention to his position in the official summit
photography: shoulder to shoulder with US President Ronald Reagan, suggesting Japan’s more
active position in the world as a close partner of the US. At the time, this was termed
‘photograph diplomacy’ (hishatai gaiko) and thereafter the position of the Japanese prime
minister in the summit photograph was regarded in Japan as an index of his success or failure at
the summit. Koizumi’s position at Evian would suggest that the days of this kind of diplomacy
are finally over.45
Summit Documentation
In total, eighteen references were made to Japan in the extensive sixty-eight pages of summit-
related literature published at Evian, in comparison and contrast to eleven to Germany, thirteen
to Italy, fourteen to the UK, eighteen to Canada, twenty to Russia, twenty-one to the US, and
twenty-five to the chair and host, France. This places Japan as an upper-middling summit
participant and demonstrates a commitment to the norm of internationalism through the
summit.46
Unlike the UN, the G7/8 has no mechanism for enforcing its decisions and relies upon the moral
weight of its communiqués and declarations. This documentation has been described as “the
scriptures of the summit, the central achievement whose creation consumes much of the summit
preparatory activity during the preceding year”.47 Although the nature, frequency and lexicon of
summit documentation have changed over the years, there is a hierarchy of documents from the
foreign and finance ministers’ declarations to specially prepared statements on urgent issues to
the leaders’ final summit statement.48 Reference to a particular issue and its position in this
hierarchy demonstrates that the leaders of the world’s leading economies have reached
agreement on its importance to global economic and political stability – an agreement that can
range from a “soft consensus” to a “fully, negotiated binding settlement”.49 Reference to a
particular summit member in the documentation is usually a request to do something, an
expression of praise or thanks, or is part of a general description of world events. On the one
hand, summit documents affect the actions of individual summit members:
Long after the leaders have flown home, their diplomats in dialogue with difficult
foreigners, officials engaged in bureaucratic battles with recalcitrant colleagues in
other departments, and leaders tempted to backslide in the parochial hear of the
political moment, wave these summit documents at their adversaries, have them
waved back at them in turn, and see the provisions of those documents having real,
continuing political force. Cheat they can and do, but in the cozy world of summitry,
they are inhibited from becoming repeat offenders by the knowledge that they are
likely to have their transgressions noticed, and by the certainty that they will have to
confront, face to face, their powerful peers in less than one year’s time.50
And on the other hand, summit statements act as the mouthpiece of the summit in providing
guidance for the other multilateral institutions that provide global governance:
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…they define the parameters, priorities, principles and work programs for the
international institutions of the previous two generations. In short, these texts are not
just pious expressions of passing politeness from preoccupied politicians but
documents that matter in the real world of politics and economics at the national,
international and global level alike.51
Whatever the case, inclusion in summit documentation demonstrates either the importance of an
issue or the activism of a government. In short, summit statements do matter, and to have an
issue included, although far from a guarantee of its successful resolution, is an achievement.
North Korea
The Japanese government’s most obvious success was the inclusion of references to North Korea
in the various G8 statements. The US administration was particularly eager to exert pressure on
North Korea over its nuclear weapons’ development program. Yet, with one eye on the public’s
reaction at home, the Japanese government managed to link international concern for North
Korea’s nuclear weapons’ program to the issue of racchi jiken. This ongoing policy of
multilateralizing the essentially bilateral issue of racchi jiken is in similar fashion to the way in
which the Japanese government multilateralized its entire policy towards the former Soviet
Union, including the Northern Territories’ dispute, during the early 1990s.52 As regards the
bilateral, territorial dispute over the four islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and Habomai,
located off the northern tip of Hokkaido and occupied by the Soviet Union in the last days of
World War Two, the Kaifu and Miyazawa administrations were successful in having statements
of support made in the declarations of three consecutive summits (1990 Houston Summit, 1991
London Summit, and 1992 Munich Summit). The instrumentalization of multilateral forums in
order to resolve essentially bilateral issues has recently become a more salient strategy in Japan’s
foreign policy. Another example is the Japanese government’s successful use of WTO rules as
both a “sword” and a “shield” in order to resolve bilateral trade disputes in its favour, when it
had previously shied away from the use of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
for similar effect.53
In previous summits, the issue of racchi jiken has been alluded to and both Japanese prime
ministers and foreign ministers have over the last few years, raised the issue with their
counterparts either within the summit discussions or the accompanying bilateral meetings. The
1999 G8 Foreign Ministers Meeting in Cologne resulted in the declaration of a series of
conclusions including one stating, “[w]e urge the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
(DPRK) to act constructively on security and humanitarian issues”, which was thought to be a
veiled reference to the issue.54 However, the Evian Summit provided the first clear statement on
racchi jiken within the documentation resulting from the leaders’ meetings. As one MOFA
official was quoted as saying, “our behind-the-scenes consensus-building (nemawashi) has been
successful both bilaterally and multilaterally [author’s translation]”.55 The inclusion of
references to racchi jiken in the summit statements was also well received in Japan, especially
amongst the five Japanese citizens kidnapped by North Korea and repatriated on October 15,
2002, and their families, who issued a number of statements welcoming the news.56 Koizumi
highlighted the consensus achieved amongst summit leaders on the issue in his post-summit
press conference:
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This question of North Korea became one of the major focal points of our discussion.
President Putin of Russia and the leaders of other countries showed very strong
interest and concern in North Korea, especially with the abduction question. Some of
the leaders expressed that they really found it very difficult to understand the
abductions. I also find it very difficult to understand the abductions. Why did they
have to kidnap Japanese nationals? I certainly understand the pains and the grief of the
parents who had their children abducted. It is utterly inhuman. But these acts did take
place. So, there is strong interest in the Japanese people in the abduction issue and we
have to take up the abduction issue and the nuclear issue at the same level in parallel
and we need to have these problems resolved comprehensively. I gained very strong
support for this matter from the Japanese stance from the leaders of the other G8
countries. Especially from President Putin. As a country that has friendly ties with
North Korea, he shared with us very valuable remarks and advice. His perception of
Chairman Kim Jong Il [sic]. He was very candid in sharing his thoughts with us.57
Chinese Participation and East Asianism
Chinese President Hu Jintao’s participation in the enlarged dialogue meeting on the first day of
the summit represented another development in the summit process and set an important
precedent. At the 2000 Okinawa Summit, Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo’s desire to invite China
as an observer and the consequent discussion ultimately came to naught.58 However, as a result
of the appointment of Hu Jintao as Chinese President in March 2003 and his participation at the
Evian Summit, it appeared that the Chinese government was beginning to shed its traditional
stance of coolly rejecting the role and work of the G7/8 summit process and preferring to
emphasize the UN Security Council. As Jia Qingguo of Peking University stated, “China is a
more and more active member of the international community – and the G8 stands for
prestige”.59
An Asahi Shinbun editorial welcomed China’s participation as a sign of its new leadership acting
as a responsible member of international society and an opportunity for the deepening of Sino-
Japanese relations.60 Moreover, there are expectations that the Chinese government could in the
future instrumentalize the G8 as a form of outside pressure (gaiatsu) in order to implement
economic and political reforms at home.61 The Japanese government’s reaction was one of
support for China’s participation in the enlarged dialogue meeting and, especially in light of
attempts to resolve issues surrounding North Korea, it welcomed China’s willingness to engage
with international society generally, and the summit process specifically. MOFA was also
supportive of Chinese participation as part of the outreach initiative to include developing
nations, and welcomed Chinese representation insofar as it places a greater focus on Asia in the
summit.62 One official was quoted as saying that “it appears that China’s position is one of
participating actively in regional and global problems. It will now be possible for Japan and
China to expand their cooperative relationship [author’s translation]”.63 What is more, the
Japanese people have expressed clear approval for China’s participation in the summit;
according to a Yomiuri Shinbun opinion poll published in September 1999, 68.7 per cent of
respondents were in favor of China’s participation, whereas 12.5 per cent were against it. 14.9
per cent were uninterested and 3.9 per cent unable or unwilling to answer.64
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However, this may well prove to be one area of future concern for the Japanese government.
Admittedly, China’s participation is so far highly limited and its invitation appears to have been
the unilateral initiative of the host nation.65 Yet, it may in the future come to be the ninth member
of a G9 summit, in a similar fashion to the Soviet Union/Russia’s steady and incremental
participation throughout the 1990s from ‘guest’ at the 1991 London Summit to ‘participant’ at
the 1994 Naples Summit, and eventually its current fully-fledged membership. As regards this
scenario, MOFA is strongly against China’s future membership as it does not regard it as sharing
the same commitment to democratic and free market principles as the other summit nations.66 It
may be ominous that this opposition once again recalls that expressed towards Russia’s
membership in the 1990s, which ultimately failed to prevent its inclusion and the birth of the G8.
The Japanese government’s concerns are also based on the fear that if in the future China does
join to create a G9, it might be directly challenged for its traditional summit role of Asian
representative, informed by the norm of East Asianism. As the only Asian member of the
summit, this is a role that the Japanese government has cherished since the first summit meeting
at Rambouillet, France in 1975 and has since then been manifested in pre- and post-summit tours
of the Asian region conducted by either the prime minister or foreign minister in order to solicit
opinions to be discussed at the summit and thereafter report on discussions and decisions.
Although China’s membership of the summit would begin to address the imbalance in the G8’s
membership by according the Asian region greater representation, it would also provide Japan
with a direct rival to this traditional summit role. It remains to be seen whether the US, as
summit host in 2005, will decide to invite the Chinese president once again and, if so, in what
capacity, but it might be the case that China’s eventual membership of the summit was set in
motion at Evian, and it will eventually be included for the polar opposite reasons to Russia,
namely, due more to its economic strength than political influence.
Russia
As mentioned above, the Evian Summit represented the full integration of Russia within the G8
summit after over a decade of assuming a variety of statuses. However, its steady and
incremental inclusion in the summit process was not wholly welcomed by Japan. At the time of
the 1997 Denver Summit of the Eight, Emeritus Professor Kamiya Fuji of Keio University
suggested that by adding another European state in the form of Russia to the summit
membership, Japan’s voice might be weakened:
Japan’s position in the G7 was not so bad. The US, Germany and Japan were once
called locomotives of the world economy. But Japan’s position in the G8 is extremely
vulnerable. It could become isolated in the G8 if it makes a bad move.… I would not
rule out the possibility that the G8 could give Japan trouble instead of helping it.67
However, these fears have not yet been realized and at Evian, “Putin seemed to take a position of
observation, basically of listening”.68 In general, Russian representatives have so far behaved in a
discrete and low-key fashion, preferring to learn the ropes of summitry, especially before Russia
acts as host in 2006.69
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Bilateralism
Previous summits have provided an opportunity for the Japanese prime minister and his foreign
and finance ministers to conduct bilateral meetings, especially with their US counterparts, on the
fringes of the official summit meetings. In fact, the degree to which these meetings have become
institutionalized has been made clear when their timing has been tampered with, as was the case
at the 1995 Halifax Summit when the Japanese government expressed opposition to any
rescheduling. However, at Evian these bilateral meetings were noticeable by their absence. The
main reason for this was that Koizumi undertook an extensive series of official foreign visits
before the summit, including Europe, the US, the Middle East, and also conducted meetings with
his Chinese and Russian counterparts in St Petersburg during the tricentennial anniversary.
During these visits in the run-up to the Evian Summit, Koizumi pledged support for the US-led
“war on terrorism” (possibly as a strategy for securing US support in a crisis on the Korean
Peninsula), in addition to raising the issue of racchi jiken and seeking the support of his hosts on
a number of occasions. Thus, the practice at previous summits was continued of blurring the line
between the conduct of foreign policy on the bilateral and multilateral levels.
Conclusions
In a number of ways, the summit process appears to be functioning, necessary and useful as it
enters its fifth cycle. After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the G8 nations were essentially united in
their efforts to combat terrorism. Divisions appeared over the war in Iraq and were played out
upon the stage of the UN, thereby damaging its reputation. The Evian Summit provided an
opportunity for the G8 leaders to make-up in public, fashion a tentative return to the unity of the
immediate post-9/11 period, and assert once more the importance of the summit process.70
Bush’s early departure in order to participate in the Middle East peace process caused some
concern as regards US intentions towards the summit process. However, Bill Clinton arrived late
for the 2000 Okinawa Summit and, after attending all the summit meetings, left slightly earlier
than originally planned in order to participate in similar peace talks. A more reliable barometer
of both US unilateralism and attitudes to the G8 will be the preparations it makes for the 2004
summit to take place from June 8 to 10 at the Sea Island resort, Georgia. The summit also
resulted in a wider dialogue with developing nations, brought China into the G8 fold in some
capacity and resulted in a record-breaking 207 commitments.71 It could be argued that the
summit process enters its fifth cycle in reasonably good health.
A US-hosted summit will provide an opportunity for the Japanese government to reinforce its
close bilateral relationship with the US generally, and for Koizumi to reassert his personal and
intimate relationship with Bush, especially as Japanese personnel may well be operating in Iraq
whilst the summit takes place despite domestic misgivings about their dispatch. Yet the Japanese
government will not instrumentalize this multilateral forum purely to pursue bilateral means, and
can be expected in the short-term to continue to play its traditional roles of “batting for Asia”
regardless of China’s participation, and seeking to make the G8 a central and effective
mechanism of global governance. Events on the Korean Peninsula between June 2003 and June
2004 will shape the Georgia Summit’s agenda and reaction to North Korea, and it would be no
great surprise if the Japanese government continues to instrumentalize this multilateral forum to
promote the resolution of the bilateral issue of racchi jiken. However, a note of caution needs to
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be struck, as a similar policy did not prove to be effective in the resolution of the Northern
Territories’ dispute.
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